This paper aims to clarify how Kant understood the relation between the two spheres of morals (Right and virtue). Did he, as O'Neill claims, acknowledge the need for civic virtue as necessary for maintaining a liberal state? Or did he take the opposite view (shared by many contemporary liberals) that citizens' virtuous dispositions are irrelevant and that all that matters is the justice of institutions? Though The Metaphysics of Morals gives the impression that Kant shared the latter position, I will argue that, in fact, Kant held a position somewhere between the Rousseauian view (which O'Neill believes Kant endorsed) that the essential difficulty of politics concerns the cultivation of civic duty in citizens, and contemporary liberals' exclusive focus on the justice of institutions, by arguing that it is the laws themselves that foster respect for the laws. In short, Kant views virtue as the felicitous by-product of legality.
sociability, which are to guarantee a respect for the law and for obligation in general. For Rousseau, the essential difficulty of politics is not how to set up just institutions, but rather how to awaken in the heart of each member of the commonwealth these sentiments of sociability, without which no social bond can last.
But is O'Neill correct that Kant recognized this interdependence between just
institutions and civic virtue as well? Would Kant have agreed that Right depends on the virtuous disposition of its subjects for its stability? I will argue that in Kant's main work on Right and virtue -The Metaphysics of Morals -no such connection between Right and virtue is to be found. Rather, Kant attempts to strictly separate the two realms of morals from one another. 3 
II -Kant's Strict Separation of the Legal and Moral Spheres
The goal of this section is to trace, throughout Kant's major works on practical philosophy, the development of the strict distinction he seeks to make between law and morality. In Section II.i we will start with the distinction between acting in conformity with duty and acting from duty developed in the Groundwork, which in the second Critique is equated with the difference between legality and morality, which, in turn, is further elaborated upon in The Metaphysics of Morals. In both cases Kant bases this distinction on a difference in the disposition of the subject with regard to a prescribed action: Does the subject comply with duty from the motive of duty (as required by morality) or is the subject motivated by some alternative incentive (such as selfinterest)?
In accordance with the two main parts of The Metaphysics of Morals (the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue), Kant comes to speak more of the distinction between Right and virtue and less of the distinction between legality and morality. As will be shown in Section II.ii, Right may only demand legality from its subjects (i.e. it may only demand compliance of BOOT, E. Kant and the In(ter) dependence of Right and Virtue our external actions with its commands), whereas virtue in addition demands that we fulfill our duties from the motive of duty (in other words, it requires morality). Crucially, the fact that Right is limited to regulating external actions insofar as they may influence the freedom of choice of others, allows it to employ external coercion in order to secure compliance with its prescriptions. The demands of virtue (such as making duty the maxim for our actions, or adopting ends that it is a duty to have) are instead of an internal nature, and can thus only rely on free inner necessitation.
II.i -Legality and Morality
As early as 1785, in the Groundwork, Kant discusses a distinction that in later works will take on the form of the pivotal contrast between legality and morality. The first part of this work starts with the bold statement that the only thing in this world that is good without limitation is the good will. Subsequently, it becomes clear that the good will is somehow related to acting from duty and that only actions done from duty possess moral worth. In order to discover, therefore, what a good will consists in, Kant discusses four examples in which the agents are acting in conformity with duty (pflichtmäβig), but not, as Kant will maintain, from duty (aus Pflicht) (GMS, AA 04: 397.11ff. 4 ). It is this distinction that allows us to determine whether a particular action possesses true moral worth or is 'merely' in conformity with duty.
In the first of these examples Kant presents us with a merchant who treats all his customers equally without attempting to take advantage of particularly naïve customers by charging them more than others. His actions are clearly in conformity with duty, yet they are not done from duty, as his motive for not overcharging is simply that it might, if it were discovered, harm his reputation as an honest dealer and consequently his business. His motive for acting in conformity with duty is thus one of self-interest (i.e. maintaining his good reputation in order to retain his customers). In this case, Kant argues, the merchant only has an indirect inclination to act in conformity with duty, as he views his honest behavior in business simply as a means to a further end. The merchant's actions are for this reason easily distinguishable from actions done from the motive of duty:
For in this case it is easy to distinguish whether an action in conformity with duty is done from duty or from a self-seeking purpose. It is much more difficult to note this distinction when an action conforms with duty and the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to it. (GMS, ethic@ -Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v. 16, n. 3, p. 395 -422. Dez. 2017
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Accordingly, the three remaining cases -concerning the duty of self-preservation, beneficence and the indirect duty to secure one's own happiness -are all examples in which the agents act in conformity with duty from a direct inclination. Even in these cases, however, Kant will argue that their actions do not possess true moral worth. An assessment of his example dealing with the duty of beneficence should clarify how he comes to this conclusion.
There are people who find satisfaction in helping others, not because it helps them achieve some ulterior end, but because they enjoy spreading joy to others. These sympathetic givers simply have an immediate inclination to act in accordance with morality's commands (in this case the duty to be beneficent). But do their actions possess true moral worth? In some respects the sympathetic giver is quite similar to the person who is beneficent from duty. For instance, they both have the same purpose in mind, namely to help others. Even the outcome of their actions may very well be the same: for instance, the fulfillment of a particular need of the recipient of aid, which, in turn, causes feelings of satisfaction and joy in the generous giver.
Kant even states that the actions of the sympathetic giver 'conform with duty', are 'amiable'
(GMS, AA 04: 398.13-14), and deserve 'praise and encouragement ' (GMS, . Why then does he ultimately conclude that beneficence from sympathy, i.e. acting in accordance with duty from inclination, does not possess true moral worth?
Kant explains that 'an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon' (GMS, AA 04:
399.35-37). The difference thus lies in the maxims or, in other words, in the grounds for choosing a particular action. Whereas the sympathetic giver makes beneficence his end, because he considers it a source of joy to himself and to those he helps, the person who helps others from duty makes beneficence his end because he views it as something that one ought to do.
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In other words, when one acts from duty the reason why one performs an action, and the reason why that action is (morally) right, are the same, whereas when one acts merely in conformity with duty there is no such coincidence between the motive for and the normativity of one's actions (Korsgaard 1996, p. 60) .
Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant returns to this distinction when he comes to speak of the incentives of pure practical reason:
And on this [i.e. whether or not subjective respect for the moral law is the sole determinant of the will] rests the distinction between consciousness of having acted in conformity with duty and from duty, that is, respect for the law, the first of which (legality) is possible even if the inclinations alone have been the determining grounds of the will whereas the second (morality), moral worth, must be placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for the sake of the law alone. As becomes clear from this passage, Kant equates legality with acting in conformity with duty and morality with acting from duty. The distinction between legality and morality thus refers to the determining ground (Bestimmungsgrund) of the will. Legality merely requires conformity of our actions with the duties that practical reason prescribes -whereby it is irrelevant whether our will is determined by duty itself or by inclination or interest -whereas morality places an additional claim on us, namely that the moral law alone be the incentive for our actions, that we act not only in accordance with the law, but also from respect for the law, that is, from duty.
Due to our imperfect nature as human beings, our free choice (Willkür) does not comply with duty of its own accord. We are thus in need of something that will keep our selfish inclinations in check and 'strike down' self-conceit (Eigendünkel) (KpV, .
Given that we 'can never be altogether free from desires and inclinations which […] do not of themselves accord with the moral law' (KpV, AA 05: 84.04-07) we thus remain in need of selfconstraint and inner necessitation. The incentive of the moral law itself provides precisely such a constraint by demanding compliance.
Morality, understood as acting from duty, is thus characterized by self-constraint and inner necessitation realized by the incentive of the moral law, which arouses in us the moral feeling of respect (Achtung). Legality, on the other hand, does not seem to have its own characteristic incentive. Instead, Kant gives the impression that any incentive will do; as long as one's actions are in conformity with duty, one has met legality's demands. However, as Kant will make clear in his final work on practical philosophy (The Metaphysics of Morals), if one is not inclined to comply with one's legal duties, Right does have an incentive of its own, namely external constraint.
In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals Kant immediately returns to the question of legality and morality:
The mere conformity or nonconformity of an action with law, irrespective of the incentive to it, is called legality (lawfulness); but that conformity in which the idea of duty arising from the law is also the incentive to the action is called its morality. (MS, This formulation of the distinction between legality and morality appears to be quite similar to the distinctions we found in Kant's earlier texts discussed above. Mere conformity with the law constitutes an action's legality, whereas morality places the additional requirement of acting in accordance with the law from the motive of duty. The difference thus still lies in our attitude toward the law in question. From this Willaschek concludes that a lawgiving is ethical if 'the incentive of duty is included in the law' (Willaschek 1997, p. 209 . Second emphasis added). Though this passage does indeed seem to warrant such a conclusion, I would argue that such a reading is incompatible with Kant's use of the term 'law' when he speaks of the two elements of all lawgiving. As Bernd Ludwig has pointed out, any conception of law that includes the incentive to abide by it is incompatible with Kant's use of the term 'law' in this crucial passage (Ludwig 1988, p. 90): 7 In all lawgiving (whether it prescribes internal or external actions, and whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice of another) there are two elements: first, a law, which represents an action that is to be done as objectively necessary, that is, which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, which connects a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law. (MS, As becomes clear from this passage, Kant considered a law and an incentive to be two distinct things, which together constitute a lawgiving. To conclude therefore, as Willaschek does, that morality refers to laws that contain the incentive of duty and legality refers to laws that accept any incentive -that, in short, the distinction between the two refers to what is included in the laws -is to ignore this twofold aspect that characterizes all lawgiving. Such an interpretation would, furthermore, lead to other misconceptions of Kant's views. For instance, the laws prescribed by juridical lawgiving and the laws prescribed by ethical lawgiving may at times, pace Willaschek (Willaschek 1997, pp. 209-10) , very well have the same content. The content BOOT, E. Kant and the In(ter) What does all this mean for the distinction between legality and morality? Whereas the main difference between juridical and ethical lawgiving concerns the incentive attached to the prescribed duty (either any incentive whatsoever or specifically the incentive of duty), the difference between legality and morality concerns the attitude of the subject with respect to its prescribed duties (cf. Kersting 1984, p. 73) . 9 As Kant explains in the Doctrine of Virtue, in the case of morality the disposition of the subject is of fundamental importance -i.e. whether or not one performs the duty from the motive of duty, from respect for the law -whereas legality only sees to compliance, irrespective of one's disposition (MS, Wolfgang Kersting has so aptly put, is 'nichts Rechtsspezifisches' (Kersting 1984, p. 73) , for one may also comply with ethical laws from an incentive other than duty. Therefore we can add that any compliance with 'laws of freedom' (MS, AA 06: 214.13) -be they juridical or ethical laws -is legal. Only when our compliance meets the additional demand of complying from duty may it be called moral. Perhaps the mention of maxims in Kant's universal principle of Right comes across as rather odd. After all, on the preceding page Kant had limited the scope of Right to our external behavior, thus seemingly excluding the maxims on which we act. As Ludwig explains however, the maxim in question is not the maxim of the agent, but rather of the action (Ludwig 1988, p. 95 ). 14 Kant comes back to this point in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, stating that the end one pursues with one's actions (in the sphere of Right) is a matter of free choice, but that the maxim of those actions is determined a priori, 'namely that the freedom of the agent could exist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law' (MS, AA 06:
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II.ii -Right and Virtue
Following the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals
382.14-16 Right does not demand of us to act in accordance with its laws from the motive of duty.
It limits itself to prescribing only external actions. Ethics, on the other hand, also requires us to perform an internal action, viz. to make the idea of duty the incentive for our actions. As becomes clear from §D, the incentive characteristic of Right is not duty, but rather external coercion. The incentive for action thus ceases to be insight into and respect for the law -motives on which virtue must rely -and is replaced by the incentive to avoid being coerced, resulting in behavior in conformity with Right. The first reason for this distinction of incentives between these two realms of morals (Sitten) is clear: as it is impossible to force someone to act from a particular incentive (as that is an internal affair), the only constraint possible in the case of virtue is free self-constraint (Selbstzwang) (MS, AA 06: 383.20; cf. 379.17, 381.16) . 15 Right, however, in contrast to virtue, does not require us to act from a particular incentive, but only that our external behavior comply with its laws. 16 Contrary to internal motives, the external actions prescribed by Right may therefore very well be externally coerced within the context of a juridical (and thus external) lawgiving. As Kant puts it:
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The doctrine of right dealt only with the formal condition of external freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxim were made universal law), that is, with right. But ethics goes beyond this and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an end of pure reason, which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end that […] it is a duty to have. (MS, Such an end that is at the same time a duty can only be the object of ethics. As setting ends is necessarily an internal matter, it cannot be enforced by external, physical coercion (as in the case of Right Consider the difference between the ethical duty of beneficence and the duty of Right to refrain from infringing upon the property of another. The latter duty is perfectly clear about what one must do (not infringe upon the property of another), and to whom one owes this duty (everyone). In the case of the former duty, by contrast, it is unclear how much we should give and to whom we should give it. This duty thus allows for some wiggle room concerning how one will fulfill one's duty to promote the happiness of others by means of beneficence. As it is not entirely clear which actions are necessary to fulfill the duty, the duty itself cannot be coerced by an external lawgiving. This does not mean, incidentally, that ethical duties are somehow weaker or less binding than duties of Right: 'a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxims of actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one's neighbor in general by love of one's parents). (MS AA 06:
390.09-12)' It does mean, however, that they are not as easily enforced externally.
Thirdly, given that virtue does not prescribe (or proscribe) particular actions (as Right does), but only sets ends that it is a duty to have (in the manner of fulfillment of which one is relatively free), its duties cannot be the object of an external lawgiving, according to Kant.
Right, on the other hand, only concerns the formal aspect of choice, which is to be limited in its external relations in accordance with laws of freedom (so that it may be compatible with an equal amount of freedom of choice for everyone else) without regard for any end, which is the matter of choice. Accordingly, its prescriptions are both sufficiently clear and concern only external actions (as opposed to setting ends), rendering it possible to actually enforce them. 
It follows from this 'emancipation' from the disposition of the subject (Höffe 1990, p. 81) 21 that strict Right requires no ethical motivation at all and can therefore rely solely on external coercion that will indeed need to be thoroughgoing (durchgängig). Whereas ethical coercion consists in constraining oneself through the idea of duty, juridical coercion is instead characterized as pathological (MS, AA 06: 219.07), by which Kant means that juridical coercion appeals to aversions. In his lectures on ethics, Kant further describes pathological coercion as the means by which 'we are trying by the idea to engender in the agent that degree of inclination [or rather aversion] of which we believe that his freedom will not have power enough to counter it' (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 521). Kant here seems to imply that compliance with the law is not a matter of choice; it is rather coerced in such a manner that human freedom cannot but obey.
We might add that by substituting free self-constraint by external coercion (or rather by the incentive to avoid external coercion), it would appear that the process of autonomous decision making we know from Kant's moral writings has become superfluous in the case of compliance with the laws of Right. Recall that in the Groundwork and the second Critique true moral worth was said to reside only in actions performed from the motive of duty, and not in those performed merely in conformity with duty. By dropping this requirement, Right, in contrast with virtue, allows for a heteronomous determination of choice. Right, understood as the protection of individual spheres of external freedom by means of reciprocal coercion, realizes its own preservation through heteronomous regulation (Kersting 1984, p. 12; Höffe 1990, p. 80) .
We are thus presented, in The Metaphysics of Morals, a picture of Right that is meant to be completely independent from citizens' inner motivations for complying with its prescriptions. Whereas morality requires autonomy -i.e. requires that the subject perform his duties from respect for the moral law -Kant seems to say that for the sphere of Right a mere heteronomous subject will suffice, a subject who acts strictly from self-interest and whose sole reason for not violating his duties is simply to evade coercion (or perhaps some other prudential reason). But is a state containing solely such heteronomous subjects tenable? Can we expect a legal system to last that relies exclusively on the external coercion of its subjects for compliance with its laws? Does not rather every Rechtsstaat depend on its citizens being motivated to act in accordance with its laws even when the incentive characteristic of juridical lawgiving, i.e. external coercion, is absent?
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If all citizens would decide to not abide by the law whenever a punishment is likely to remain absent, the rule of law would not be ensured. In other words, any legal system would be 
Emphasis added).
Here, Kant appears to provide us with a first clue. The problem we face is that, though any legal system factually depends on the good will of its subjects, it may only rightfully demand external compliance with its laws. In Toward Perpetual Peace Kant proposes a solution to this problem by arguing that the very fact of living in a Rechtsstaat profoundly influences not only our external behavior -by means of external coercion -but also our internal motives for that behavior.
Further clues can be found in a relatively extensive footnote where Kant argues as follows: Citizens' immoral way of thinking (Denkungsart), a result of their remaining in an uncultured state, could lead to unlawful acts. This not-yet-moral disposition is veiled, however, by coercive civil laws, 'for the citizens' inclination to violence to one another is powerfully counteracted by a greater force, namely that of the government' (ZeF, AA 08: 375n). On the outside, it would thus appear as if all citizens had become virtuous, but in reality they merely act justly from compulsion, not from duty; their immoral predisposition is simply veiled, but still present beneath the cloak of legal coercion. These devils might still each privately wish to pursue their own selfish interests at the cost of others, but within the state their malevolent dispositions 'so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the same as if they had no such evil dispositions' (ZeF, AA 08: 366.21-23). 23 This is, essentially, Glaucon's point in Plato's Republic: we merely act justly from compulsion, but as soon as we get the chance to act in whichever way we wish (when the threat of legal coercion disappears) -as in the case of the shepherd-become-king Gyges -we will take it and obey the law no longer (Plato 1937, 2.359a-360d) . Kant leaves Glaucon behind, however, when he adds the twist that the veil itself -'the coercion of civil laws' -greatly contributes to the forming of a moral disposition, thus Emphasis added). In short, Kant's point is that the maxim to act from respect for the law, which is crucial for any legal system, is cultivated by the rule of law itself. In other words, by preventing 'the outbreak of unlawful inclinations [which is the work of Right] the development of the moral predisposition to immediate respect for right is actually greatly facilitated' (ZeF, AA 08: 375-6n. Emphasis added). sense of justice or a concern for those who would be disadvantaged by their defection, preferably both. When these sentiments are sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations to violate the rules, just schemes are stable' (Rawls 1999, p. 435) . 25 Just laws and institutions are therefore in need of a widespread sense of justice among the citizenry, if they are to be stable.
Rawls's solution for the development of this sense of justice is the benign influence of those very laws and institutions that were in need of a sense of justice in the first place.
This may appear to be a circular argument (as it may in Kant's formulation of it), but for Rawls it functions instead as a criterion for the laws and institutions that are to be set up:
the basic institutions of a stable constitutional regime ought to be set up in such a manner that they 'encourage the cooperative virtues of political life' (Rawls 2001, p. 116) . When just institutions function well over time, Rawls assumes that these virtues will thereby be encouraged. Rawls's point here appears to be one of moral psychology. He maintains that it is a psychological law that our recognition of the benefits of living under enduring laws and institutions -provided they respect the two principles of justice of course -, 'not only encourages mutual trust among citizens generally but also nurtures the development of attitudes and habits of mind necessary for willing and fruitful social cooperation' (Rawls 2001, p. 117 .
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Emphasis added; cf. Rawls 1999, p. 414-5) . Such laws and political institutions generate their own support, in the sense that 'those who grow up in the well-ordered society in which that conception [i.e. a stable conception of justice] is realized normally develop ways of thought and judgment, as well as dispositions and sentiments, that lead them to support the political conception for its own sake' (Rawls 2001, p. 125. Emphasis added) . In this manner, just laws and institutions, themselves in need of civic virtue in order to be stable, actually generate the desired virtuous disposition on their own.
Though Kantian Right and virtue may at times prescribe the same actions, most of Kant's efforts in The Metaphysics of Morals are dedicated to strictly distinguishing the one from the other, whereby the chief difference concerns the incentive that is to motivate the agent's behavior. Whereas duties of Right may be coerced externally, duties of virtue can rely on inner self-constraint alone. Consequently, Right may not demand that agents fulfill their duties of Right from the motive of duty. Nonetheless, any legal system does de facto rely on at least the majority of its subjects acting from the motive of duty, and thus in accordance with
Right even when coercion is absent.
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant does not address this dependence of Right on virtue.
On the contrary, he appears to be at great pains to develop a system of Right that has severed any and all ties to virtue (with regard to incentives for actions), that is, he wishes to render Right fully independent from ethical motives for actions, leaving his conception of Right open to the threat of instability. Given that Right may not demand virtue from its subjects, but nonetheless does depend on it for its own stability, we needed to find a way in which virtue could be cultivated, but not coerced. It seems we have found a solution to this problem in the slightly earlier text Toward Perpetual Peace. Kant argues there that the very act of living in a good constitutional state develops our virtue by instilling respect for the law in us: 'it is not the case that a good state constitution is to be expected from inner morality; on the contrary, the good moral education 26 of a people is to be expected from a good state constitution' (ZeF, . A morally educated people can, in turn, legislate better, resulting in a constitutional state that moves ever closer to the desired end, namely 'the best constitution in accordance with laws of right ' (ZeF, . This improved constitutional state, in turn, can ameliorate its people's moral education even further, resulting in that particular people being able to improve their state further still, and so on. This exchange between the objective order -the Rechtsstaat -and the subjective ethical development of the people is Kant's answer to the problem that confronted us in The Metaphysics of Morals.
Yet, there is something more this answer shows us. We started out with O'Neill's statement that Right depends on virtue (that is, on people acting from the virtuous motive of duty) for its own stability. Now, after a brief discussion of Toward Perpetual Peace, it turns out that the virtue on which it must rely, is cultivated by Right itself. In other words, not only does Right need virtue, but virtue is also dependent on Right for its development, entwining both in a relation of reciprocal dependence. 28 Right may not demand that we act in accordance with its laws from the motive of duty, but a good legal system can cultivate in us a respect for the law. This Rechtsachtung can ensure we obey the law even when external coercion is absent.
IV -Conclusion
According to O'Neill, Kant (like Rousseau) is part of a tradition that, contrary to contemporary liberalism, emphasizes the necessity of virtue for the preservation of just laws and institutions.
Contrary to her assertion, however, we initially found, basing ourselves on a reading of The Metaphysics of Morals, that this is not the case. In his main work dealing both with Right and virtue, we found that, far from arguing for the interdependence of these two spheres of morals maintains. Yet, the process by means of which this virtuous character comes about requires, according to Kant, merely legality. In other words, whereas an author like Rousseau relies explicitly on such means as censorship, a wise Lawgiver and a civil religion in order to ensure respect for the law in the heart of each citizen, Kant relies instead solely on legality, that is, on the felicitous effects of outward compliance with the law. Living under (just) laws is all that is required in order to eventually end up with citizens who comply with the law's prescriptions not from fear, nor from prudence, but from respect for the law itself.
A concern for civic virtue is thus not the starting point for Kant, as it is for Rousseau (and as it seems to be for O'Neill), but rather the end point. O'Neill ignores this difference.
Thus, though we found in Toward Perpetual Peace -despite all the evidence to the contrary in 7 The distinction between a law prescribing a particular duty and the incentive to perform that duty lies, furthermore, at the basis of the whole structure of The Metaphysics of Morals. After all, the main difference between the two constitutive parts of this work -i.e. between Right and virtue -lies not in a difference of duties, but rather in the different incentive that accompanies the fulfillment of duties: 'The doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties as by the difference in their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with the law' (MS, AA 06: 220. [15] [16] [17] . 8 This connection between the juridical sphere and the use of external coercion (Zwang) to ensure compliance will be dealt with more extensively in Section II.ii. 18, 384.32) , thus bringing this passage in line with the other passages in which Kant distinguishes between legality and morality. Again, legality simply requires the conformity of our action with duty, whereas morality places an additional claim on us. Not only our action, but also the maxim, i.e. the disposition or attitude, guiding our action must conform with the law.
11 Kant hereby specifies that these actions are to be understood as Facta, which are those actions that one has freely brought about and of which one may therefore be regarded as the author (cause libera) (MS, AA 06: 227.21-23).
12 Only Willkür is of any concern for Right, that is, the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen) of the homo phaenomenon directed toward empirical actions. Wille, by contrast, or the practical reason of the homo noumenon, does not enter Right's purview. 13 Most scholars have taken this point to exclude any kind of welfare rights in Kant. This minimalist reading argues that by excluding wishes and needs, Kant also excludes their fulfillment, i.e. happiness. There are, however, other passages in in the Doctrine of Right, such as the following, where Kant explicitly recognizes the right of the state to redistribute wealth through taxes: 'To the supreme commander there belongs indirectly […] the right to impose taxes on the people for its own [des Volkes] preservation, such as taxes to support organizations providing for the poor, foundling homes and church organizations ' (MS, ). Yet, proponents of the minimalist position will point to passages from Theory and Practice where Kant appears to refute, quite vehemently, any kind of welfare state. He argues, for example, that a 'government established on the principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father toward his children -that is, a paternalistic government […] -is the greatest despotism thinkable (a constitution that abrogates all the freedom of the subjects, who in that case have no rights at all)' (TP, AA 08: 290.33-291.05). But in this passage Kant merely wishes to clarify why happiness can neither be a juridical principle, nor a principle for state policy. He argues that happiness is too indeterminate and variable to form a basis for public laws, as the understanding of happiness differs from person to person, which seems to be a rather convincing argument. To infer from this however, as the minimalists do, that Kant therefore forbids social welfare legislation is an erroneous conclusion. For all that Kant says in this passage, and others similar to it, is that the state may not impose its conception of happiness upon its citizens, which is an argument against the threat of paternalism: 'No one can coerce me to be happy in his way' (TP, . He says nothing about providing citizens with a minimum of means needed to be able to formulate and pursue one's own conception of happiness. The matter is therefore not quite as straightforward as it is often made out to be by ignoring crucial passages in which Kant actually supports the redistribution of wealth and by the misreading of others. (Kersting 2004, p. 221) . 22 Indeed, this intuition is confirmed by studies in the field of social sciences, concerned with compliance with legal norms, such as Tom R. Tyler's classic Why People Obey the Law. He distinguishes instrumental reasons for complying with the law, which amount to a weighing of the probability that one will be punished if one does not comply, from normative commitments. These, in turn, can be divided between personal morality (obeying the law, because one considers it just) and legitimacy (obeying the law, because one retains that the law enforcing authority has the right to prescribe actions). Tyler's research clearly points out that relying on coercive measures alone (and thus on instrumental reasons) is not at all conducive to the stability of a State. His findings are backed up by an entire body of existing research indicating 'that in democratic societies the legal system cannot function if it can influence people only by manipulating rewards and costs' (Tyler 2006, p. 22) . Such societies are, furthermore, under constant threat of instability. This point is also commonly made in legal theory, as exemplified by H.L.A. Hart when he maintains that the legal system will be most stable when people conceive of themselves as morally bound to accept the legal rules voluntarily : Hart 1994, p. 203, cf. p. 201 . Similarly, John Rawls argues that a wellordered society requires not only just institutions, but also a sense of justice to maintain these institutions, if the well-ordered society is to be stable: Rawls 1999, pp. 397-401 . Indeed, given that a great deal of Part III of A Theory of Justice is dedicated to the relation between justice and the good, it would seem Rawls was not as dismissive of the good as O'Neill believes him to be. 
